Organization Theory and the Study of European Union Institutions: Lessons and Opportunities by Murdoch, Zuzana
Organisation Theory and the Study of European Union Institutions:  




University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway 





Most scholarship in modern Organisation Theory maintains a near-exclusive focus on private-
sector settings. In contrast, this article argues that complex public-sector organisational 
systems – such as the European Union (EU) – can provide a very relevant laboratory to both 
fine-tune organisation theoretical propositions and test them empirically. I thereby first draw 
attention to the value-added of Organisation Theory for the study of EU institutions. Then, I 
turn to these institutions’ capacity to present a springboard for theoretical development in 
Organisation Theory, and bring forward a number of avenues for further research on the 
intersection of EU studies and Organisation Theory that can push forward both research fields. 
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Organisation Theory takes as its “main object of study the complex or formal organisation” 
(Fligstein, 2001: 4), and thereby asks: “How and why do (members of) organisations behave 
as they do, and with what consequences?” (Greenwood et al., 2008: 1). The absence of any 
reference to private- or public-sector organisations in these expressions of Organisation 
Theory’s central research focus is noteworthy and deliberate. Both public- and private-sector 
organisations are indeed, in principle, valid objects of research for the general theoretical 
approach underlying Organisation Theory. Yet, while many classic contributions to the early 
development of Organisation Theory were based on observations taken from public-sector 
organisations (e.g., Weber, 1922/1978; Gulick, 1937; Selznick, 1949), the 1960s and 1970s 
witnessed a major shift in the Organisation Theory research agenda towards private-sector 
firms, markets, leadership, and management issues. As a result, since the end of the 1990s the 
very large majority of Organisation Theory scholarship has concentrated on private-sector 
organisations (March, 2007; Arellano-Gault, 2013). In fact, the focus on private-sector 
organisations is now so prevalent that – according to Fligstein (2001: 2) – non-Organisation 
Theory scholars “think most of Organisation Theory is about firms and [that] the theory does 
not seem to have much application to other kinds of social arenas”.  
 
In this article, I explore the recently reinvigorated idea that public-sector organisations can 
still provide an important springboard for theoretical development in Organisation Theory 
(March, 2007; Ahrne and Brunsson, 2010; Arellano-Gault et al., 2013). My central argument 
is that complex public-sector organisational systems – such as, for instance, the European 
Union institutions (my empirical case in much of the discussion below) – can represent very 
relevant laboratories to both fine-tune theoretical propositions in Organisation Theory and test 
them empirically. Why is the European Union such an interesting case from the perspective of 
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Organisation Theory scholarship, and what is the intrinsic value of studying the EU 
institutions as organisations? Clearly, the European Union is a heterodox public organisation, 
which makes that it should ideally be studied using a variety of theoretical perspectives. Thus 
far, however, much of the academic attention awarded to the EU institutions derives from 
either legal scholars, or political scientists in the fields of International Relations (IR) and 
Public Administration (PA). Whereas legal scholars have tended to focus on the set-up, 
mandate and functions of the EU institutions (e.g., Shaw, 1996; Von Bogdandy, 2000; 
Schütze, 2014), scholarship in IR has been particularly concerned with the role and power of 
EU institutions in world politics as well as the motivations behind their establishment and 
maintenance (Caporaso, 1996; Jupille and Caporaso, 1999; Pollack, 2001). In the PA tradition 
of EU studies, the European institutions have been a fruitful ground to study the behavioural 
patterns of international bureaucratic staff (Hooghe, 2005; Suvarierol, 2011; Kassim et al., 
2013; Suvarierol et al., 2013) and the representativeness and international socialisation of 
international civil servants (Gravier, 2008, 2013; Stevens, 2009; Beyers, 2005, 2010; Ban, 
2013; Murdoch et al., 2014). This role-division acros the IR and PA traditions reflects that 
while “IR usually is better in explaining why international organisations are created, (…) PA 
is better suited at analysing the policy-making role of international organisations and their 
bureaucracies in day-to-day politics” (Ege and Bauer, 2013: 135).  
  
Although Organisation Theory scholarship has fruitfully contributed to recent developments 
in the PA strand of EU studies, and pushed forward our understanding of the internal 
workings of the EU institutions (e.g., Egeberg, 1996; 2001; Murdoch and Trondal, 2013; 
more details below), my key contention in this article is that the EU institutions can also offer 
important potential contributions to the development of Organisation Theory scholarship. This 
view is inspired by Schimmelfennig (2010: 39), who argues that “there are two general 
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sources of development and change in theories of European integration”. One refers to 
general “theoretical innovations and refinements” within political science or related 
disciplines, while the other “may reflect political developments in European integration itself” 
(Schimmelfennig, 2010: 39). He then goes on to claim that “enlargement has been the major 
real-world challenge for integration theory” (Schimmelfennig, 2010: 49), a line of argument 
likewise held by Jupille et al. (2003). This line of reasoning naturally extends to the promise 
held by the study of EU institutions for Organisation Theory scholarship. The underlying idea 
is that “the EU as an unsettled polity provides fertile empirical ground for theoretical 
development” (Bátora, 2010: 628-629; see also Olsen, 2010; Trondal and Peters, 2013) as 
well as empirical verification of theoretical propositions with respect to classic issues in 
Organisation Theory. This includes, for instance, the study of processes of organisational 
change and development; how specific organisational structures arise, develop, decline and 
are replaced by others; the conditions conducive to institutional entropy, institutionalisation 
and deinstitutionalisation (Greenwood et al., 2008). Moreover, unstable systems “are 
especially likely to call attention to phenomena and mechanisms that are not easily observed 
in well-entrenched, stable polities” (Olsen, 2010: 12), such that the EU as a polity in transition 
can be particularly useful in developing answers to such key questions. 
 
In the first part of this article, I discuss the key questions and assumptions underlying 
Organisation Theory. These will (presumably) be broadly familiar to most readers, but this 
discussion helps set the stage for the arguments and examples provided subsequently. 
Moreover, to put this in historical perspective, I also illustrate how certain social 
developments have impacted the development of the Organisation Theory field and its locus 
of interest. This historical contextualisation is imperative for my argument because it allows 
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me to draw attention to the potential opportunities embedded in opposing developments in the 
study of complex trans-national public administrations.  
 
The second part of this article then turns to the value added of Organisation Theory for the 
field of EU studies. This section is not meant to be exhaustive in any sense, and 
predominantly relies on two specific EU-applications of the theory: i.e. i) the behavioural 
decision-making of EU bureaucrats, and ii) the differentiated nature of EU integration 
(understood, following Schimmelfennig and Holzinger [2012: 1] as the “territorially 
fragmented validity of EU rules”). The examples provided serve two closely related purposes. 
On the one hand, they more clearly illustrate how we can move from a broad theoretical 
framework, over the generation of testable hypotheses, to empirical evaluation within an 
Organisation Theory approach. On the other hand, they further clarify the theoretical 
discussion in the first part of this article, and thereby prepare the ground for the observations 
made during the third and final part.  
 
In the final section, I explore how in-depth studies of the EU institutions can provide 
important springboards for theoretical development in Organisation Theory. This can be 
viewed as one particular application of Axelrod’s (2014, 91) recent argument that “political 
scientists have gained tremendously by borrowing from established disciplines, but also have 
quite a lot to offer”. Although I specifically focus on the potential embedded in the study of 
complex public-sector organisational systems such as the EU, the discussion in this final 
section will continuously stress how insights from transnational public-sector governance can 




1. Organisation Theory: A brief history and overview 
Organisation Theory studies formal organisations, defined as “the goals to be achieved, the 
rules the members of the organisation are expected to follow, and the status structure that 
defines the relations between them (…) [which] have been consciously designed a priori to 
anticipate and guide interaction and activities” (Blau and Scott, 1962: 5). It might 
immediately be noted here that this definition specifically requires the ‘goals’, ‘rules’ and 
‘status structures’ to have the specific aim of guiding individuals’ interaction and activities, 
but remains agnostic about the final outcome of these interactions and activities. At the heart 
of the Organisation Theory approach thus lies the idea that it is impossible to fully understand 
organisational decision-making without analysing the structural aspects of organisations. 
Although such structures are not all-important and individual agents retain at least some 
discretion (a situation often referred to as ‘embedded agency’; Garud et al., 2007), individuals’ 
capacity to make decisions is argued to depend “on the routinization of practices within the 
structures and the availability of common decision-premises among the members” (Peters 
2011: 85).  
 
This is a key conceptual starting point in Organisation Theory, where scholars rely on the 
concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1945; March and Simon, 1958) to stress the primary 
role of structures in relation to actions. Applied to an organisational setting, Simon’s bounded 
rationality idea implies that “members of organisations have limited knowledge or cognitive 
capacity”, such that the design of organisational structures becomes “vital for channelling 
attention and decision-making behaviour” (Christensen et al., 2007: 10-11). That is, from the 
perspective of Organisation Theory, “organisational design, the setting of goals and the 
creation of standard operating procedures all work to solve problems of bounded rationality” 
(Fligstein, 2001: 17). The central focus thus lies on organisations as a ‘mobilisation of bias’ 
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(Schattschneider, 1975) that contributes to a systematic patterning of cognitive search 
processes among organisation members.  
 
Note, however, that decisions and outcomes always remain the result of the interplay between 
agency and structure, rather than the outcome of either one of these independently (see also 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Scott (2008: 78), for instance, argues that viewing “behaviour 
as oriented toward and governed by rules need not imply (…) that behaviour is ‘unreasoned’ 
or automatic”. Similarly, Powell and Colyvas (2008: 277) recognize the role of individual 
agents within the structures when maintaining that “members of organizations engage in daily 
practices, discover puzzles or anomalies in their work, problematize these questions and 
develop answers to them”. As such, Organisation Theory aims to recognise both the 
“enduring importance of laws and structures” (Bevir 2011: 9) and “the ways in which 
individual actors take action to create, maintain and transform institutions” (Scott 2008: 76). 
Such interplay between structure and agency is arguably especially relevant since “many 
features of organizational life are uncertain (…) [and] wrought with ambiguity” (Powell and 
Colyvas 2008: 283).  These uncertainties and ambiguities indeed not only complicate a clear-
cut mapping from preferences to decisions by organisational structures (assumed to exist 
under a purely structural approach), but also open up space for human agency and 
interpretation. 
 
From the above discussion, it appears natural that organisational structures in Organisation 
Theory studies act as independent variables, while the substantive ‘outputs’ of organisations – 
i.e. decision-making behaviour directed towards clients, user groups, and so forth in the case 
of private-sector organisations, or public policies in the case of public organisations – are the 
dependent variables. This has indeed been the dominant approach throughout much of 
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Organisation Theory history (Scott, 2008). However, organisational decision-making can also 
be directed inwards, and relate to the administrative decisions that affect the institutional 
structure of the organisation itself. One could thereby think of mergers, reforms, 
reorganisations, or changes in procedural rules or organisational locus. Organisational 
structures under this viewpoint are naturally subject to change, and become the central 
dependent variable. This viewpoint largely arose in the literature on institutional and policy 
entrepreneurship (for a review, see Battilana et al., 2009) and has become central to the more 
recent research agenda on institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2011). Naturally, both 
conceptions of structures – i.e. as dependent and independent variable – need not be mutually 
exclusive. That is, the general nature of the ‘decision-making’ concept within Organisation 
Theory leaves space to study both perspectives, even though previous work in the 
Organisation Theory tradition that focuses on both the effect of structures and their design has 
been surprisingly scarce. 
 
Similarly, as mentioned above, references to ‘organisations’ in Organisation Theory’s central 
research focus deliberately refrain from specifying these as private- or public-sector 
organisations. Both types of organisations – as well as intermediate forms arising from, for 
instance, public-private partnerships – are open to investigation within Organisation Theory. 
From this perspective, it is interesting to observe that early contributions to the field tended to 
study public organisations. Indeed, Arellano-Gault et al. (2013: 146, italics added) argue that 
“public organizations have offered a fruitful ground for the emergence of modern knowledge 
about organizations”. A pioneering work thereby remains Max Weber’s (1922/1978) study of 
the Prussian state and its administration. Other classic contributions to the early development 
of Organisation Theory include analyses of the US public administration by Luther Gulick 
(1937) and Philip Selznick (1949). However, the increasing financial power of American 
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business schools in the 1960s and 1970s lead many “promising Organisation Theory scholars 
(…) to migrate to business school positions” (Arellano-Gault, 2013: 150; March, 2007). This 
migration induced a shift in the research agenda within Organisation Theory, as business 
schools naturally prefer their research and teaching output to concentrate on private-sector 
firms, markets, leadership, and management issues.  
  
Given the origins of much Organisation Theory scholarship in studies of public-sector 
organisations (see above), the remaining two sections of this article explore the idea that 
public-sector organisations can still provide an important springboard for theoretical 
development in Organisation Theory. As mentioned above, I thereby particularly focus on the 
intrinsic value to Organisation Theory scholarship of studying the EU as an organisation. The 
next section first presents EU studies as a research field, and indicates how Organisation 
Theory can provide an important theoretical value added in this field. Then, I assess the 
potential role EU studies can play for Organisation Theory. This section specifically brings 
forward a number of avenues for further research on the intersection of EU studies and 
Organisation Theory. 
 
2. The Value of Organisation Theory to Public-Sector Research: The Case of European 
Union Studies 
The field of EU studies is by now very large, and has covered a broad field of topics including 
the study of EU institutions an sich (often referred to as studies into ‘the nature of the beast’; 
e.g., Nugent, 1992, 2010), EU institutions’ legitimacy and the democratic deficit often 
attributed to the EU (e.g., Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Kohler-Koch, 2010; Schmidt, 2013), 
European integration and the differentiated nature thereof (e.g., Holzinger and Knill, 2002; De 
Neve, 2007; Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012), different types of Europeanization (e.g., 
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Olsen, 2002; Cowles et al., 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Knill et al., 2009), EU 
governance (Kohler-Koch, 1996; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006), and so forth. In stark 
contrast to modern Organisation Theory scholarship, EU studies is becoming increasingly 
characterised by a dominance of European scholars with affiliations in social science 
departments (Kreppel, 2012; Andrews, 2012). I will return to the potential implications of 
these diverging developments below. 
 
Putting legal scholarship focusing on the set-up, mandate and functions of the EU institutions 
aside (see above), most existing research in EU studies relies heavily on theoretical 
frameworks drawn from the fields of Public Administration and International Relations. The 
latter scholarship tends to treat international organisations as epiphenomena of state 
interaction and views (member) states as the key actors (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; 
Anderfuhren-Biget et al., 2013). The theoretical focus thereby often lies on more normative 
theories discussing the legitimacy challenges of EU integration (Eriksen, 2009; Eriksen and 
Fossum, 2012) – sometimes referred to as the ‘normative turn’ in EU studies (Bellamy and 
Castiglione, 2003). This literature thus often ignores what happens inside the EU institutions, 
and can be linked to the prominent role of International Relations scholars such as Karl 
Deutsch, Ernst Haas and others in the early stages of EU studies (Sverdrup, 2010; Jupille et al., 
2003). The Public Administration branch of EU studies instead focuses on the internal 
workings of the EU institutions, and often has theoretical foundations in social-psychological 
research on socialisation processes (Johnston, 2001; Beyers, 2010) or theories of bureaucratic 
representation (Gravier, 2013; Murdoch et al., 2014). 
 
For both these branches of EU scholarship, however, there lies significant potential in 
approaching the European institutions from an Organisation Theory perspective. One of the 
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reasons behind this argument could be derived from Hix’ (1998: 62) lamentation that the 
European “environment is so complex and unpredictable [that] institutional and structural 
factors are more influential than calculating rational action in determining policy outcomes”. 
Although mainly intended to point out the apparent irrationality of EU policy-making, the 
stress on the importance of ‘institutional and structural factors’ indicates that EU studies may 
have a lot to learn from Organisation Theory. It indeed highlights that our understanding of 
the internal workings of the EU institutions may well benefit from a more in-depth analysis of 
the role played by their specific structural design. In similar vein, the same argument also 
suggests that taking into account (cross-country differences in) the design of member state 
institutions might advance our understanding of (cross-country differences in) maintained 
support for EU institutions and the introduction/application of EU rules. The remainder of this 
section illustrates this using two specific examples: namely, studies explaining the 
behavioural decision-making of EU bureaucrats, and studies analysing differentiated 
integration. 
 
2.1. Bureaucratic decision-making within the EU institutions 
From an Organisation Theory perspective, the study of bureaucratic structures is critical to a 
correct understanding of the decision-making behaviour of public officials. Based on a careful 
study of the organisational design, we can infer hypotheses about its influence on individuals’ 
identities, roles and decision-making behaviour. To give one very specific example, consider 
the potential role of an organisation’s structure, which consists of its ‘vertical specialisation’ 
(i.e. the organisation’s hierarchical design and assignment allocation) and its ‘horizontal 
specialisation’ (i.e. “how different issues and policy areas (…) are supposed to be linked 
together or decoupled from each other”; Egeberg, 2003: 159). Within the latter, there are four 
fundamental ways in which horizontal specialisation can take place: i.e. according to purpose 
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(sector), process (function), territory and clientele served (cf. Gulick, 1937). The important 
thing to observe here is that drawing such horizontal “organisational boundaries might affect 
information exchange, coordination processes (…) and conflict resolution” (Egeberg, 1999: 
157-162; Christensen et al., 2007). The reason is that these boundaries will focus “a decision-
maker’s attention on certain problems and solutions, while others are excluded from 
consideration” (Egeberg, 1999: 159). Consequently, they are likely to have direct and 
important effects on organisational members’ identities, roles and decision-making behaviour. 
 
Such predictions appear particularly relevant in the European context because the myriad of 
EU institutions and services display substantial heterogeneity in terms of their basic structural 
design features. Some EU institutions are “structured according to territory [such as the 
European Council], according to a non-territorial principle of specialisation such as sector or 
function [as in the Commission]” (Egeberg, 2003: 162), or according to a combination of 
political party and function (as in the European Parliament) (Egeberg, 2001; Egeberg et al., 
2013, 2014). As such, an Organisation Theory perspective is likely to significantly improve 
our understanding of differences in the patterns of organisational decision-making across 
these diverse institutions. This, in turn, carries direct policy relevance. For instance, insights 
gained from organisation-theoretical studies of the EU institutions can help reveal how its 
administrative and institutional environment can be most effectively designed to achieve 
certain aims. This issue clearly has high political and societal salience, and is closely linked to 
Weber’s view that bureaucratic structures are “a rationally designed tool, deliberately 
structured and restructured in order to improve the ability to realize externally determined 




Interestingly, there is already some empirical evidence supporting the value-added of a 
rigorous Organisation Theory approach in EU studies. For instance, as predicted by an 
Organisation Theory approach to organisational decision-making, the contact networks, 
perceptions of power relationships, and configurations of cooperation and conflict of 
European Commission and Parliament officials – both contracted and permanent – have been 
shown to be systematically patterned by the vertical and horizontal organisation of their 
respective organisations (Egeberg, 1996, 2001; Murdoch and Geys, 2012; Egeberg et al., 2013, 
2014; Murdoch and Trondal, 2013). The behavioural patterns within the European Council, 
on the other hand, are much more driven by national preferences, reflecting the dominant 
territorial principle of specialisation there (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006; Egeberg, 
2012).  
 
Still, as much previous work in this field relies on survey-based evidence – and thus analyses 
of individuals’ self-perceptions of their behaviour – the link to actual decision-making should 
be explored in more detail. Future research should also give more careful attention to potential 
(re)socialization processes of EU officials by developing panel-based research designs where 
EU officials are ‘followed’ at various stages throughout their career (see also Beyers 2010; 
Suvarierol 2011; Suvarierol et al. 2013). Such longitudinal design not only allows studying 
the “processes through which a sense of administrative identity and role is developed, lost and 
redefined” (Olsen 2003: 522), but also provides the means to at least partially overcome the 
problems of recruitment (or selection) bias, pre-socialisation and self-selection that cross-
sectional datasets are, by construction, unable to address (Martin and Simmons 1998; Beyers 




2.2. Differentiated integration 
Since the 1990s, an increasingly prevalent feature of European integration is “the territorially 
fragmented validity of EU rules” (Schimmelfennig and Holzinger, 2012: 1). While the six 
founding states initially intended to “establish a united Europe in which all member states 
take part to the same extent” (Koller, 2012: 3), this so-called ‘final objective’ has gradually 
been set aside in subsequent Treaty reforms – and is now all but abandoned. Instead, it is 
increasingly the case that EU rules apply in some member states, but not in others – and opt-
outs for particular countries on specific policies have become a recurrent point of discussion 
during the legislative process. 
 
There is a large academic literature mapping the development of such ‘differentiated 
integration’, but Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012: 293) recently pointed to the lack of 
“theory-oriented research” in most of this existing work. In my view, Organisation Theory 
could provide one theoretical perspective that has the ability to help explain territorial 
variation in integration across member states. Olsen (2002: 934) has, for instance, argued that 
differentiated domestic responses to EU-level influence “are likely because the (West-
)European political order is characterized by long, strong and varied institutional histories, 
with different trajectories of state- and nation-building, resources and capabilities”. Clearly, 
such observation is also valid, if not more so, for the new member states that have joined 
since 2004 – as well as for the comparison of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ European countries. 
Extensive cross-country differences thus continue to exist in terms of goals, rules and status 
structures of member state institutions (terminology taken from Blau and Scott, 1962; see 
above). As a result, an Organisation Theory perspective highlighting the importance of pre-
existing structures would effectively predict that European legislative developments will 




Empirical studies reviewed in Trondal (2007: 967) appear to substantiate such hypothesis, 
since he finds evidence in existing work that “adaptation towards Europe is considerably 
mediated through and conditioned by existing domestic institutions” (see also Hartlapp and 
Leiber, 2010). Clearly, this is only a starting point, and more work should be done on moving 
“from mapping to providing an explanation of the EU’s growing and considerable variation” 
(Paterson et al., 2010: 10). A more rigorous integration of Organisation Theory scholarship is 
thereby likely to further develop our explanatory power with respect to (the drivers of) the 
territorial fragmentation of EU rules. Such insights would again carry significant policy 
relevance since it will help clarify the particular bargaining stances of EU member states with 
respect to specific policy issues, and reveal how countries’ administrative, legal and 
institutional environment motivates their actions. Such knowledge is evidently of central 
importance to achieve mutually profitable progress in complicated inter-institutional 
negotiations. 
 
It might be noted here that the empirical and theoretical importance of focusing on ‘existing 
domestic institutions’ in inter-organisational settings would naturally carry over to 
international settings beyond the EU. One can think, for instance, of explanations of countries’ 
bargaining stances in international fora (such as the Kyoto and Copenhagen environmental 
summits, the negotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership between the US and the EU). Moving beyond the public 
sector, it is likely to bear important implications also for research on mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). Most research by economists and management scholars in this field has concentrated 
on the strategic and financial fit between merging firms (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988), 
and social psychologists tend to focus on potential difficulties induced by cultural differences 
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between the organisations (Gleibs et al., 2008; Ball and Garcia-Lorenzo, 2013). An 
Organisation Theory perspective, however, would suggest that merger success or failure will 
also be considerably mediated through, and conditioned by, any differences in the 
organisational structures of the merging firms. This idea is in line with Lin’s (2012, 1832) 
recent argument that “successful acquisitions are argued to rely on effective organizational 
integration of both target and acquirer” (Lin, 2012, 1832). 
 
3. The Value of Public-Sector Research to Organisation Theory: Foundations of a 
Feedback Loop  
While EU studies thus has successfully imported concepts and ideas from Organisation 
Theory, the last paragraph of the previous section already hints at potential feedback loops – 
with insights gained from studying EU institutions feeding back into broader organisation-
theoretical frameworks. This section shifts attention more directly to such potential for a 
feedback loop from EU studies to Organisation Theory. One key reason behind such feedback 
potential lies in two characteristics of scholars engaged with the study of EU-level public-
sector organisations. As mentioned, there is not only an “increasing prevalence of Europe-
based scholars engaged in EU studies” (Kreppel, 2012: 636; Andrews, 2012), but these are 
also primarily affiliated to social science departments rather than business schools. This 
development is in direct opposition to that observed in Organisation Theory, where US 
scholars located at business schools have taken a leading role since WWII (March, 2007; 
Arellano-Gault et al., 2013). This is an important observation, because social scientists are 
likely to have a stronger interest in, and knowledge of, public-sector organisations compared 
to business school scholars. This provides an ideal setting for unlocking the capacity 
imbedded in the study of public-sector organisations for theoretical development and 




A second key reason, however, lies in the nature of the EU itself. As argued more extensively 
in the introduction, the unsettled nature of the EU polity is likely to provide a particularly 
fertile environment for theoretical development and empirical validation with respect to 
classic issues in Organisation Theory scholarship. Unstable systems are indeed “especially 
likely to call attention to phenomena and mechanisms that are not easily observed in well-
entrenched, stable polities” (Olsen, 2010: 12). This includes, as I will argue in detail in the 
remainder of this section, the drivers and consequences of processes of organisational change 
and development, insights into structure-versus-agency debates, the role and influence of 
leadership approaches for organisational performance and development, and so on. 
 
3.1. Micro-foundations of embedded agency 
The first of these opportunities links to the micro-foundations of embedded agency within 
organisational change processes (Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Suddaby, 2010). Organisation 
Theory scholars traditionally concentrate predominantly on the organisational field, and tend 
to pay somewhat less attention to organisations as such, or actors within these organisations. 
Yet, several scholars have recently pointed towards “the desirability of multilevel analysis 
that include looking at micro processes as well as macro contextual factors” (McAuley et al., 
2007: 459). A similar sentiment is also voiced by Greenwood et al. (2008: 29): “We see 
considerable promise in this change to an intra-organisational level of analysis for expanding 
insights into institutional processes”.  
 
Such approach naturally requires a pivotal role for agency within organisational structures (i.e. 
‘embedded agency’; Garud et al., 2007). The continuous modification and transformation of 
the European polity creates an environment ideal for enriching our understanding of the 
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micro-foundations of such embedded agency. Admittedly, this is not an entirely novel 
proposition. Olsen (2003: 511), for instance, likewise argues that “during periods of transition, 
conceptions of the exemplary administration are challenged and can be dramatically refined”. 
Yet, only few studies have thus far taken up this challenge. One recent exception is Murdoch 
and Geys (2014), who exploit the EU’s complex and changing institutional framework to 
analyse how institutional entrepreneurs managed to drive developments in the organisational 
structure of the European External Action Service. 1  The key insight is that institutional 
entrepreneurs’ interpretive efforts induce a diversity of opinion with respect to agents’ 
understanding of existing institutions. This then results in a bargaining situation – or 
‘discursive struggle’ (Maguire and Hardy 2006: 7) – that lies at the heart of institutional 
development (Maguire and Hardy 2006: 8; Schmidt 2008; Saurugger 2013). It is important to 
observe that this study not only generates important insights for EU scholars, but also for 
Organisation Theory more generally. It indeed seems reasonable to assume that similar 
processes may likewise arise in private-sector settings with respect to, for instance, the 
continuous proliferation and (global) circulation of new management tools (e.g., Management 
by Objectives and Results (MBOR), Supply Chain Management, Project Management, 
Knowledge Management; Czarniawska and Sevon, 2005). 
 
Another instance where EU studies may contribute to the study of embedded agency in 
organisational change processes comes from the observation that reliance on seconded 
national experts (SNEs) – i.e. national public officials temporarily hired by an international 
organisation for their expertise in a specific field – has in recent years increased considerably 
within the EU institutions (Murdoch and Trondal, 2013; Trondal et al., 2015). Within the EU 
                                                            
1 The European External Action Service is at the heart of the new institutional framework of the European 
Union’s foreign policy, and was created as a sui generis service to assist the EU’s ‘foreign policy chief’ (i.e., 
the so-called High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) in the execution of 
his/her mandate. The service obtained formal approval in July 2010 (i.e., Council decision 11665/1/10 of 26 
July 2010), and is operational since January 2011.  
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legal framework, this expansion in the number of SNEs automatically also increases the 
number of officials that will return home after such term-limited postings (which requires 
their compulsory re-integration into member state institutions; Murdoch and Trondal, 2013). 
Given their multiple affiliations and ambiguous embeddedness, SNEs are often considered as 
potential agents of change in both the EU institutions (i.e. as a carrier of member-state 
opinions; Geuijen et al., 2008), and the national administrations (i.e. allowing EU institutions 
to extend their influence in the national administrations though a process of 
‘Europeanisation’). While existing empirical evidence on their actual influence remains mixed, 
SNEs clearly represent an interesting case to analyse whether and how influence is carried 
between different organisational structures by specific (individual) agents. Moreover, the 
substantial variation in the share of SNEs working across the EU institutions – i.e. they 
typically represent less than 10% of staff with policy-making competencies in the EU 
institutions, but make up more than one third of policy-making staff in the European External 
Action Service – allows gaining some insights as to potential threshold values above which 
such temporary staff can, or might, become an agent of change.  
 
Importantly, the multiple affiliations and ambiguous embeddedness faced by SNEs in the EU 
institutions can often likewise be observed among temporary staff members in the private 
sector. One could hereby think of, for instance, individuals employed via temping agencies. 
The same multiplicity of affiliations can, however, also exist at the top of firms’ hierarchy 
through the common practice of interlocking directorates (Mizruchi, 1996). Insights from 
studying whether and how influence is carried between different organisational structures by 
specific (individual) agents in the EU setting could thus carry important insights also for 





3.2. Meta-organisations and comparative Organisation Theory research designs 
Ahrne and Brunnson (2008, 2010) recently developed the concept of ‘meta-organisations’, 
which can be (somewhat loosely) defined as organisations where the members are not 
individuals, but other organisations (see also Malets, 2010; Kerwer, 2013). They thereby 
explicitly refer to international organisations – such as the World Trade Organisation, 
European Union, United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and so on – as key examples. 
Current Organisation Theory scholarship, however, has tended not to address these kind of 
organisations. Ahrne and Brunsson (2010: 2) explain this lack of interest by noting that 
organisation theories “almost always are based on the assumption that the members of 
organisations are individuals” – such that the perception arises that traditional theories may 
simply not apply to meta-organisations (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2010: 2). Yet, rather than 
ignoring such meta-organisations altogether (as in, for instance, neo-realist accounts of state 
interaction; Mayntz, 2009) or treating them as equivalent to organisations with individuals as 
members, there is a significant theoretical and empirical benefit to taking this “special form of 
organization seriously” (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2010: 3) 
 
For instance, taking a meta-organisation seriously as an organisation directly implies the 
recognition that such an organisational form is likely to affect its members (for instance, in 
terms of their autonomy). However, as convincingly argued by Ahrne and Brunsson (2010: 4), 
the extent of this “impact varies among meta-organizations, (…) and it is important to find 
explanations for this variation”. The concept of meta-organisations thus inherently creates the 
important possibility – and requirement – to engage in a comparative organisation-theoretical 
research programme. From a theoretical perspective, exploiting this comparative leverage is 
important to assess the idea that “everyday behavioral dynamics inside international 
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bureaucracies may reflect less the IO in which they are embedded and much more the 
organizational architecture inside international bureaucracies themselves” (Trondal, 2014: 
22). As such, we can exploit comparative research designs to develop crucially important 
‘scope conditions’ for the validity of theoretical hypotheses, and insights into how, for 
instance, cultural and personal aspects impact the relevance of organisational structures. From 
an organisational design perspective, such insights are fundamental for understanding when, 
and how, organisations’ structures have behavioural implications – or, reversely, under which 
conditions differing structures can evoke the same outcomes. This, in turn, provides the 
necessary tools to think about how one could shape organisational structures most effectively 
such as to achieve pre-specified aims. 
 
The European Union and its institutions – as a meta-organisation – thus provide one venue for 
such comparative research from an Organisation Theory perspective. This may initially sound 
odd because the EU has often been perceived as sui generis – a case so special that it defies 
comparison and results obtained in studying it defy generalisation (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2010: 
3). Yet, such view ignores what Kreppel (2012) and Wille (2013) refer to as the 
‘normalisation’ of European Union and the European Commission, which arose around the 
turn of the millennium. Jupille et al. (2003: 8), for instance, have convincingly argued that the 
EU allows studying “a variety of economic, social, political and institutional developments, 
none of which is unique to it”. Johnston (2005: 1037) mirrors this view when arguing that 
“some Latin American institutions are as formally complex as some European institutions, yet 
the practice of solving disputes inside them often tends to rely on informal elite interaction”. 
He also sees “potential similarities between the ASEAN Regional Forum and COREPER in 
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terms of the effects of small group interaction” (Johnston, 2005: 1037).2 Both observations 
clearly call for more cross-regional comparative research building on insights from an 
Organisation Theory perspective. 
 
It is important to observe at this point that such value added of comparative public-sector 
research can be expected to likewise benefit private-sector scholarship. One prominent 
example thereby concerns our understanding of the relations between, and organisational 
behaviour of, different firms within one conglomerate. Indeed, while Ahrne and Brunnson 
(2008, 2010) have international organisations consisting of a set of member state 
organisations in mind when defining meta-organisations, multinational corporations at least 
appear to fit the same mould. So do conglomerates consisting of a multitude of related, but 
partly independent firms. Also in these cases, therefore, it will be of substantial theoretical 




A third opportunity for a feedback loop from EU studies to Organisation Theory exists with 
respect to studies of organisational leadership. It has been more than 55 years since Selznick’s 
(1957) path-breaking book on Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation 
appeared. Reviews of this book clearly reflect its public-sector inspiration and were published 
predominantly in social science and public administration journals (e.g. American Political 
Science Review, American Sociological Review, Public Administration Review, Public 
Administration, and Public Personnel Review). Yet, its subsequent influence has been mainly 
felt in the fields of management (189 citations in Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science) and 
                                                            
2  COREPER stands for Committee of Permanent Representatives. It ‘consists of the Member States’ 
ambassadors to the European Union’ and is ‘chaired by the Member State which holds the Council Presidency’ 
(cited from http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/coreper_en.htm). 
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business (106 citations), rather than public administration (76 citations). This not only once 
again reveals the dominance of business school scholars within modern Organisation Theory, 
but also exposes an important bias in the type of knowledge we have collected about the 
concept and functions of leadership. 
 
More specifically, while we have learned much about the pure day-to-day management aspect 
of leadership, much less is known about leadership from a macro-level perspective; that is, 
with respect to the role of leadership patterns for the development, legitimacy and survival of 
organisations and their core values (Washington et al., 2008). Yet, it was arguable the latter 
aspect of leadership that lay at the heart of Selznick’s work, since he conceived of leadership 
as “far more than the capacity to mobilize personal support; it is more than the maintenance of 
equilibrium through routine solution of everyday problems” (Selznick, 1957: 37). The 
distinction is important because the functions expected of leaders as “managers” and leaders 
as “statesmen” (Selznick, 1957: 4) are substantially and substantively different. In effect, the 
former principally aim to “provide guidance, support and feedback to subordinates” in order 
to achieve organisational goals (Boal and Schulz, 2007: 412), while the latter should be 
predominantly engaged to “define the ends of group existence, to design an enterprise 
distinctively adapted to these ends, and to see that the design becomes a living reality” 
(Selznick, 1957: 37). Despite the obvious social and political relevance of the latter set of 
activities, few scholars have dealt in detail with this aspect of Selznick’s original ideas 
(Washington et al., 2008).  
 
This observation is particularly relevant when thinking about complex public-sector 
organisational systems because it indicates that the concept of ‘leadership’ in such public-
sector framework has remained under-developed – even though the efficiency ideals of New 
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Public Management are heavily influenced by leadership conceptualisations taken from the 
private sector. Yet, it is not altogether self-evident that public- and private-sector leadership 
have a sufficient overlap – or deal with the same type of leadership requirements – to validate 
such transfer of the leadership concept from private- to public-sector settings. Recent 
developments within the European Union again can provide an important possibility to 
address this gap in the literature. One can thereby, for instance, turn to the ongoing 
“presidentialisation” and Executive Order Formation in the European Commission (Kassim 
2010; Bauer and Ege, 2012). The terms ‘presidentialisation’ and ‘executive order formation’ 
refer to a trend observed within European parliamentary democracies as well as the EU 
institutions towards the empowerment of chief executives (i.e. the prime minister, the 
president of the European Commission, and so on). That is, it reflects a shift in the 
“institutional balance of power between the executive and the legislature” in favour of the 
former (Johansson and Tallberg, 2010: 208; see also Heffernan, 2003). Evidently, this 
requires leaders to be much more ‘statesman’ than ‘manager’, and thus allows studying the 
difference in organisational behaviour involved with such transitions.  
 
Studies of the Kinnock reforms in the European Commission have already taken some steps 
in this direction.3 Evaluations of this reform have, for instance, argued that they “improve[d] 
the possibilities (…) to assert political influence” (Dijkstra, 2010: 528; Murdoch, 2012). This 
links directly to Moe and Wilson’s (1994) claim that players’ capacities for exercising power 
are a function of their ‘bureaucratic structure’ – which brings us back to a central role for 
Organisation Theory in these discussions. It should also be noted here that the lessons learnt 
from EU institutions in this respect could carry important possible implications also for 
                                                            
3  The Kinnock reform of the European Commission “implemented a programme of far-reaching change, 
involving the simultaneous overhaul of personnel, financial management, and planning systems in six years 
between 1999 and 2005” (Kassim, 2008: 648; see also Commission of the European Communities, 2000; 
Bauer, 2008). It was precipitated by a deep crisis following the resignation of the Santer Commission in March 
1999 due to serious allegations of financial mismanagement. 
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private-sector organisations. Successful leadership of one firm may indeed provide important 
benefits also externally – for instance with respect to merger or takeover processes.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Early contributions to Organisation Theory were often based on close observation of public-
sector organisations. As a result, Organisation Theory has been highly visible in various parts 
of political science, not least through the work of influential scholars such as James G. March 
and Johan P. Olsen. More recently, however, the very large majority of Organisation Theory 
scholars study private-sector organisations. In this article, I have argued for a re-integration of 
research on public-sector organisations into Organisation Theory scholarship. I thereby 
specifically pointed to the study of the European Union and its multifaceted institutional 
framework as a promising springboard for both theoretical and empirical development. The 
central argument is that complex public-sector organisational systems (such as the EU) can be 
a very relevant laboratory to both fine-tune organisation theoretical propositions and test them 
empirically. As highlighted in the specific examples provided throughout this article, such in-
depth analysis of EU institutions as organisations is likely to carry important insights also for 
private-sector settings. For instance, insights from transnational public-sector governance can 
be expected to carry over into research on private-sector firms in a globalised economy. 
Furthermore, work into the micro-foundations of embedded agency and, more broadly, the 
evaluation of institutional change and its drivers in public-sector settings will no doubt enrich 
our understanding of such processes across public and private sectors. Overall, as recently 
also argued by Axelrod (2014, 91), we should keep in mind that “political scientists have 
gained tremendously by borrowing from established disciplines, but [they] also have quite a 




Clearly, however, the EU institutions are best seen as one specific example within public 
administration / public-sector studies where the study of public-sector organisations can 
present an important springboard for theoretical development in Organisation Theory. The 
same line of argument can easily be applied to other complex international public-sector 
organisational systems such as those of Mercosur or ASEAN, or to ‘hybrid’ situations where 
both public- and private-sector activities are going on (e.g. health care, transport, education, 
and so on). In fact, the latter, hybrid organisational settings effectively raise the interesting 
possibility that properly accounting for the diversity and breadth of private- and public-sector 
research – and how these can contribute to the development of Organisation Theory – requires 
developing a continuum from private- to public-sector research. 4  This naturally requires 
developing theoretical models and approaches with the fundamental ability to take into 
account both sectors.  
 
Finally, my focus on the EU institutions is not meant to overlook the inherent promise of 
other fields of public-sector research that closely link with Organisation Theory research: e.g. 
public management studies, (public service) motivation, administrative leadership, political-
administrative relations, and so on. While many scholars have to various degrees tapped into 
this potential by testing predictions from Organisation Theory modelling on public-sector 
organisations (e.g., Korunka et al., 2003; Bordia et al., 2004; Rafferty and Jimmieson, 2010; 
Ibsen et al.; 2011; O’Reilly and Reed, 2011), more could be done to fully exploit the exciting 
laboratory offered by public-sector organisations for Organisation Theory scholarship. My 
discussion about EU studies is thus likely to similarly apply to other areas of public-sector 
research, and I hope it can stimulate future research also in such other fields of public 
administration / public-sector research.  
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